mean to cover both coercive policies and policies merely perceived as coercive. The second section notes several seemingly coercive policies. The third section elaborates on one, which we call 'locally specialised medical training'. The fourth section mentions ways in which actions and policies that initially seem too coercive can be (a) non-coercive, (b) coercive non-problematically, or (c) justified on balance. The fifth section uses this insight to defend locally specialised medical training from the charge of excessive coerciveness. The sixth section further defends locally specialised training from that charge by comparing it to two policies in other areas, which are more coercive, less urgent, and yet, clearly legitimate: conditioning doctors' board certification on working as residents; and redistributive taxation.
Seemingly coercive responses to the brain drain
Some policies that seek to diminish medical brain drain may seem to involve a problematic degree of coercion. Consider the following examples.
Since 2008, the UK has stopped issuing work visas to doctors and other health workers from countries outside the European Union (EU), including ones with critical shortages (Travis, 2008) . If many more Western countries adopt similar policies, perhaps following global legislation on health worker migration, then international employment options for doctors from countries with critical shortages would be severely curtailed.
In 2007, the Indian health ministry proposed to apply a policy already in use in many countries: to make a compulsory year of rural service a precondition for basic medical degrees. This set off student demonstrations, strikes, and 'Gandhigiri' protest including fasting to death (Kalantri, 2007; Shivakumar, 2007) . In Ghana, MD degrees are given only a year past graduation (Dovlo and Nyonator, 2003) , presumably in order to force graduates not to rush to emigrate but to stay, reconsider, and develop local ties that may discourage emigration.
More than 20,000 Cuban doctors staff many of Africa's, Haiti's, and especially Venezuela's underserved rural clinics (De Vos and Van der Stuyft, 2006; Mullan, 2008) . According to some reports, circumstances in Cuba place considerable pressure on these doctors to provide this help (de Albornoz, 2006) . For example, for many, serving abroad is currently the only legal way to live outside Cuba.
Are these policy responses to the brain drain legitimate, despite their seeming coerciveness? Presumably, responses to the brain drain can be wrong for being too coercive. Imagine a 'super coercive policy' in which
